Taxonomy of malware detection techniques by Mohaddes Deylami, Hanif et al.

Taxonomy of Malware Detection Techniques: 
A Systematic Literature Review 
 
Hanif Mohaddes Deylami a,1, Ravie Chandren Muniyandi a,2 
Iman Tabatabaei Ardekani b,3, Abdolhossein Sarrafzadeh b,4 
 
a School of Computer Science, Faculty of Information Science and Technology, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 43600 UKM Bangi, Malaysia. 
b Cybersecurity Research Center, Unitec Institute of Technology, 
Private Bag 92025, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142, New Zealand. 
 
1 hmdeilami@gmail.com, 2 ravie@ukm.edu.my 
3 iardekani@unitec.ac.nz, 4 hsarrafzadeh@unitec.ac.nz 
 
Abstract - Malware is an international software 
disease. Research shows that the effect of malware is 
becoming chronic. To protect against malware detectors 
are fundamental to the industry. The effectiveness of 
such detectors depends on the technology used. 
Therefore, it is paramount that the advantages and 
disadvantages of each type of technology are scrutinized 
analytically. This study’s aim is to scrutinize existing 
publications on this subject and to follow the trend that 
has taken place in the advancement and development 
with reference to the amount of information and sources 
of such literature. Many of the malware programs are 
huge and complicated and it is not easy to comprehend 
the details. Dissemination of malware information among 
users of the Internet and also training them to correctly 
use anti-malware products are crucial to protecting users 
from the malware onslaught. This paper will provide an 
exhaustive bibliography of methods to assist in 
combating malware.  
Keywords - Malware; Malicious code; Taxonomy; 
Anomaly-based; Signature-based; System requirements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Computers and information technologies (IT) have 
played a major role in the advancement of the last 
twenty years. Computer-based crimes using malware 
involve personal computers, private information of 
users which could be ‘sensitive’, network 
infrastructure, mobile platforms, and other internet 
based programs. Malware development is on the 
increase and enables an attack on much of a user’s 
information without distinction. Malware has had a 
tremendous impact on the world, as we know it. Since 
1988 [1, 2] the increase in the number of computer 
based security breaches confirms that malicious 
software has reached almost unmanageable levels. 
Taking into consideration the extent of potential 
damage caused by malicious software, its detection 
alone has caused significant problems for both the 
investigators and general population. Detection 
systems created by investigators are regularly put to 
extensive use in detection exercises. This paper is 
dedicated to researching malicious software detection 
methodologies. 
A. Research Motivation 
The structure of malware analysis and services has 
become an even more attractive target for potential 
attackers. A sequential methodology reveals the make-
up of the malicious software and the way it operates. 
During analysis a critical procedure called ‘behavior 
monitoring’ is employed using “dynamic coarse-
grained binary instrumentation” on the target system. 
‘Profiling’ [3] is the terminology used to describe the 
first collection of malicious software for investigation. 
A malicious software detection system itself can be a 
target for attack - the confidentiality, integrity, 
availability of its information bank, data and the 
virtualized infrastructure could be used by the malware 
to initiate fresh onslaughts on the detector system. The 
situation would become virtually unmanageable if a 
powerful computing system, with a huge storage 
volume, were attacked by internal malware. 
On January 7, 2014 Fox IT, which is headquartered 
in Holland, published a report stating that many 
Yahoo.com visitors were corrupted via Java exploit. 
The advertising arm of Yahoo - Ads.Yahoo.com - had 
been compromised and a virus broadcast to their users. 
It was estimated by Fox IT that by December 30, 
almost 300,000 users per hour were affected by the 
virus, with approximately 27,000 suffering serious 
consequences. In this instance, Yahoo’s advertising 
system was transmitting a so-called ‘exploit kit’.  Fox 
IT determined that the ’exploit kit’ would focus on 
weaknesses in the Java program to exploit and 
download all types of malicious software programs on 
the user’s computer. The malware supplier has yet to 
be detected, but it is speculated that they may have 
made large financial gains via selling information from 
the affected systems to third parties [4, 5]. Due to the 
need for absolute control over the system structure, the 
ability to detect malicious software has been greatly 
affected. Absolute control plays a significant part in 
safeguarding surfers’ data in the Internet environment. 
This paper collates the problems faced by experts in 
preventing the development of malware in the Internet 
industry. An attempt is made to pull together the 
resources experts use and consolidate the fragmented 
work that is currently being done so that a robust and 
concerted effort can be made to combat the 
proliferation of malicious software. This concerted 
effort will focus on developing the required detection 
technology.  
B. Research Boundaries and Limitations 
“Multi-purpose” detection systems - which are 
more comprehensive in their functions - are being 
considered and proposed in this research. In an attempt 
to reduce false-positive rates, a number of researchers 
are concentrating on a dedicated detection process path 
to narrow down on a particular type of malicious code. 
Since malicious software detection is the key focus 
of this paper, much concentration is being put on recent 
updated literature and systems. The result of studies is 
based on the taxonomy of malware as explained in the 
following section. Irrespective of the extent to which 
the science and technology of malware detection has 
progressed, this paper has based its investigations on 
the following research questions: 
RQ1. What requirements should malicious software 
detectors comply with to be effective? 
RQ2. What is the taxonomy of the malware detection 
technique? 
RQ3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of 
existing solutions for malware detection? 
II. MALWARE DETECTION SYSTEM 
DEFINITIONS AND TAXONOMY 
‘Mal’ in the Spanish language means ‘bad’. 
‘Malware’ is described by other terms such as 
malicious software, malicious code, or malcode. The 
following definitions represent the different 
explanation of malware by some of the researchers.  
a) Malware’s intention is to be destructive [6]. 
b) Malicious code is any code introduced into a 
system to sabotage the system [7]. 
c) ‘Malware’ is a specific name used for a category of 
software codes that is malicious. This would 
include “Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Spywares” 
(Table I & II).  People, who develop malware, 
employ generators, include jargon, and also use 
other people’s codes. The need to exchange 
information exists among malware developers and 
many are focused on knowing all about the best 
ways to introduce malwares [8].  
d) Malicious software is designed to penetrate and 
operate in one’s computer and carry out the 
instructions of the developer [9]. 
e) The original definition of a malware in 1983 was: 
“a program that can 'infect' other programs by 
modifying them to include a possibly evolved 
copy of itself”. This definition was later updated 
in ‘Computer Viruses - Theories and 
Experiments’ [10]. 
TABLE I. Various Computer Security Terms 
Type Definition 
Malware 
When a software attacker intends to corrupt 
someone’s computer he/she sends out a malware, 
which consist of Virus, Worms, Trojans, Adwares, 
Backdoors, Spywares, Bots, Rootkits and so on. 
Most malicious software’s are generally termed 
viruses. Anti-viruses sold in the open market are 
also called anti-malwares. 
Spam 
The term used to describe abuse/misuse of internet 
mail (IM) services is Spam. This also includes mail 
that is not requested or asked for and these are called 
‘e-mail spam’. Included in this portfolio are IM 
spam, blog spam, discussion forum spam, spam in 
hand-held phones, etc. 
Phishing 
Phishing is defined as a malicious activity using 
social engineering techniques. For example, abuse 
of internet commercial and financial services is 
termed phishing. Phishing also includes attempts to 
acquire sensitive information such as usernames, 
passwords, and online banking information. 
Exploits 
When a weakness or loophole occurs in a 
computerized system or software, an attacker 
usually unloads a series of instructions, called 
Exploits, to take advantage of that weakness to 
corrupt the system without the host user’s 
knowledge, this can happen to both software and 
hardware. The main aim of this exploit is to gain 
absolute control of the host’s electronic or computer 
system. 
TABLE II. Various Malware Terms 
Type Definition 
Virus 
A computer virus, duplicates or reproduces itself, 
usually corrupting or maligning other programs 
installed in the hosts’ system. Without personal 
assistance, it may be a bit difficult for a virus to 
reproduce itself.  
Worm 
A worm is slightly different from a virus in the sense 
that it does not need external help to reproduce or 
duplicate itself on computer networks. It operates on 
its own. 
Trojan 
Trojan Horses or Trojans are usually ’wolves in 
sheep’s clothing’ because they attack or malign a 
computer system in disguise. 
Spyware 
Spyware is any program or software that is mounted 
clandestinely in someone’s computer to not allow 
the user to do what he/she wants. The user, most of 
the time, is not aware of the installed spyware. 
Others 
Most other malicious programs, including: logic 
bombs - that look like legal programs but malign the 
actual program; rootkits - that consist of tools for 
hacking and also malign the proper operation of any 
software; backdoor -  a term used to describe a 
process that prevents or interferes with the 
authorized operation of a system. 
The concept of a ‘computer virus’ takes its name 
from a fictional science based novel where a computer 
program named “virus” was able to mutate. In the 
educational field it was used by Cohen in his thesis 
“Experiments with Computer Viruses” [10] however, 
literature on viruses can be found earlier than Cohen’s 
first usage. Apple II computers were among the first to 
be attacked by viruses in 1981 and 1982. The first 
recorded incidence of a virus was called Elk Cloner in 
mid-1981. This was followed by ‘Brain’ in 1986, a 
boot sector virus. 
Science fiction also gave birth to ‘Worm’, this 
name was first used by John Brunner who wrote the 
novel ‘Shockwave Rider’ to depict a program that 
broadcasts itself on a network. But Shoch says he was 
the first to introduce the term in the academia [11]. 
A. Organization of Malware Detection  
Malicious software detection is split in two ways: 
Signature- and Behavior- based technologies and each 
technology can be used with static, dynamic or hybrid 
analysis [12]. The particular methodology for an 
anomaly- or signature- based procedure is based on 
how the technology collates the information to detect 
malicious software [13-15]. How malicious software 
detection is managed is shown in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1. Ecosystem of malware detection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures employed for detecting malicious 
software can be summarized into two parts: 
A. Anomaly-Based Detection 
An anomaly-based detection draws upon its 
information base to determine the presence of normal 
behavior to decide the strength of the malware under 
investigation. Another form of anomaly-based 
detection could be called specification-based 
detection. Anomaly-based detection investigation 
takes places in two situations: 
 A training or learning situation. While in the 
training situation the detector tries to learn the 
normal behavior. It is quite possible that the 
detector is learning the host’s behavior or the PUI’s 
or maybe both combined. The main benefit of the 
anomaly-based detection is its capability to detect 
zero-day intrusions. 
 A detection or monitoring situation. 
The two essential drawbacks of this procedure are: 
 High false alarm rates: It is prone to excessive false 
alarm rates, which is defined as ‘normal’ outputs 
categorized as (false positive) and divided by the 
total number of ‘normal’ behavior. 
 The difficulty in ensuring what parameters need to 
be learned in the training situation. 
a) Specification-Based Detection  
To deal with high false alarm incidence that goes 
with many anomaly-based detection procedures, a 
specification-based detection, which is similar to an 
anomaly-based unit, is utilized. Due to the fact that 
specification-based detection is derived from anomaly-
based detection, it is used to estimate the requirements 
for a system, rather than trying to estimate the 
execution of an end-use for a system. Moreover, in 
specification-based detection the training situation is 
the guideline, which dictates or forecasts all outcomes 
that any behavior of a program may show for that 
particular system being safeguarded or under 
investigation. The major drawback of specification-
based detection is that it is not easy to predict all the 
acceptable outcomes fully and precisely that a system 
will manifest. 
B. Signature-Based Detection 
Signature-based detection utilizes its technology-
based personality to discern a malware and 
consequently confirm the malevolent nature of a 
program under investigation. Putting it another way, 
the signature-based detection tries to create a 
benchmark using the malware and subsequently uses 
this as a reference for detecting other malicious 
software. 
In grouping all these models, the signature-based 
detection generates a database for itself. In a perfect 
system, it is imperative that the signature should 
recognize any program manifesting a behavior fitting 
the signature’s malicious database. This database 
contains all information needed by the signature to 
detect malicious software. This database is consulted 
whenever there is a potential problem with the PUI. 
One of the main problems of the signature-based 
detection method is its inability to recognize ‘zero-
day’ intrusions. A zero-day intrusion is a situation 
where there is no similar signature in the database to 
compare with. Also an experienced person is probably 
needed to design the signature.  Aside from giving way 
to operator error it is a tedious process if the design and 
installation is not set up to function automatically. Due 
to the fact that certain malware is able to proliferate the 
ability to design and install a more precise signature is 
extremely critical. Developers of such signatures, 
which function on an automatic mode, could be found 
without much effort, but significantly more energy 
needs to be put in to doing this. However, all detection 
procedures could use one of three various 
methodologies.  
 Static: As in language, static analysis uses the 
structure or formatting of the programming to 
uncover the malware under investigation. 
Generally, a static methodology strives to uncover 
malware prior to the program under investigation 
being implemented. 
 Dynamic: During pre- or post- program 
implementation malware can be detected utilizing 
a dynamic methodology. 
 Hybrid: Hybrid procedures are available which 
combines the two methodologies, meaning both 
static and dynamic databases are used to uncover 
malicious software. 
 
III. MALWARE DETECTOR 
As set out in the introduction, a malicious software 
detector is a device that uses technology to detect 
malware. The function of the detector is to recognize 
malevolent software using signatures and other 
problem solving skills. One example of a detector is 
for instance, an antivirus scanner. Malware detectors 
are the first line of defense in combating viruses. Its 
function is to safeguard the system against any 
intrusion. The detector could be located in the host or 
outside. The detection system functions via the 
established technology and performs an observed 
evaluation of malware detecting skills [15, 16]. The 
efficacy of a similar detector depends on the skills it 
possesses. 
There are dual inputs to any malware detector. The 
first such output is its ability to recognize the malware 
in question. In anomaly-based detection the detector 
has less information in the initial phase of its operation 
and gains in confidence at the top of the learning curve. 
Therefore, a deviant behavior could easily be detected 
by an anomaly-based detection system due to its skills 
[17]. Due to the inherent nature of the detection system 
any deviant behavior is assumed to be malevolent and 
is therefore captured by the anomaly-based detector. If 
the detector is of a signature-based type, its reaction is 
triggered by its memory base. This memory base is 
usually brought up to currency by designated people 
who are able to recognize malware and manifest it in a 
format acceptable to the signature database and 
eventually readable by the relevant equipment [18, 19]. 
The malware detector has to have another input and 
that is the program under investigation. The moment 
the detector knows what it terms as malevolent 
behavior (normal behavior) and the program under 
investigation, it will call upon its database to consider 
whether the program is malevolent or not. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The authors [20-27] have recommended that for the 
purpose of writing a literature review paper the 
following method be adopted to source material for 
review: 
The beginning stage for the review should include 
the doctoral research papers from universities around 
the world since they have been scrutinized at higher 
levels. Online libraries have often been the resource 
centers for postgraduate research. “Malware” and 
“malware analysis” are keywords that have been 
utilized to relate to various theses for research. The 
next stage should include journals and papers 
presented at forums worldwide since these have been 
vetted by people possessing expertise in the field and 
have been accepted for publications or discussions. 
The list of research papers (from serial number 1-
11) and theses (from serial number 12-18) included in 
the review and their classifications with respect to their 
topics and contributions have been summarized in 
Table III.
TABLE III: Classification of Existing Related Papers Based on Malware Detection Technique 
No. Title 
Authors and 
Date of 
publication 
Contribution 
1 
The Effects of Different 
Representations on Static 
Structure Analysis of 
Computer Malware Signatures 
[29]. 
Ajit 
Narayanan, 
et al. (2013) 
The objective of this research is to ascertain the feasibility of a stand-alone 
discussion of ‘malware-modeling’ utilizing the expanding and accessible 
signature storehouse. It is to demonstrate that should malware signatures be 
coded according to their biometric identity, it is possible to use benchmarked 
‘sequence alignment’ procedures from bioinformatics to enhance the precision 
of differentiating worm and virus biometrics. In addition, “aligned signature 
sequences” can be excavated by means of preset excavation processes to obtain 
future biometrics that will aid to differentiate between worm and virus 
signatures. 
2 
An approach for detection and 
family classification of 
malware based on behavioral 
analysis [30].  
S. S. Hansen, 
et al. (2016) 
This study tackles the problem of analyzing, detecting and classifying the vast 
amount of malware in a scalable, efficient and accurate manner. They propose a 
novel approach for detecting malware and classifying it to either known or 
novel. 
3 
Method and apparatus for 
detecting malware infection 
[31]. 
Gu, Guofei, 
et al. (2015) 
The present invention generally relates to network security, and more 
particularly relates to the detection of malware infection. 
4 
Malware Analysis and 
Classification: A Survey [36]. 
Gandotra, E., 
et al. (2014) 
This research delivers a summary of procedures for assessment and categorizing 
the malicious software. 
5 
Survey on malware detection 
methods [32].  
Vinod, P., et 
al. (2009) 
The research concentrated on different malicious software detection 
methodologies such as signature-based detection, program comprehension, of 
non-understandable information (codes) to detect malware. 
6 
Detection & Preservation of 
New & Unknown Malware 
using Honeypots [84]. 
Kumar, Pant 
(2009) 
A system to set up and make known a program to trap unsuspecting malware 
and to cure affected programs. 
7 
Classes of Vulnerabilities and 
Attacks [89].  
Pascal 
Meunier 
(2008) 
This research focuses on what details are useful, and how they fail to meet 
researcher criteria. A list of security problems and discussed and various 
classification methods are reviewed by considering security concepts. 
8 
Malware Forensics-Detecting 
the Unknown [35].  
Martin, 
Overton 
(2008) 
The study researched what methods are available or generated to assess the 
malware in question. Also concentrated on an organized strategy to assess the 
complete scenario regarding questionable files. 
9 
A Survey of Malware 
Detection Techniques [12].  
Nwokedi 
Idika, Aditya 
P. Mathur 
(2007) 
This research assessed 45 malicious software detection methodologies to afford 
a chance to measure the similarity or dissimilarity of one system versus the other 
to establish a tight, dependable system. 
10 
TT Analyze: A tool for 
analyzing malware [37].  
Bayer, 
Kruegel, 
Kirda (2006) 
It’s an available technique called TT Analyzer for the purpose of dynamically 
assessing the mannerisms of Windows Executables. 
11 
Behavior based Approach for 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
[38]. 
Andrey 
Dolgikh 
(2013) 
This research presents the cyber experimentation and behavior based Intrusion 
detection. The results of experiments show high detection rate and low overhead 
for both approaches. Such results suggest that modern sophisticated malware 
can be automatically detected and suppressed with these systems. 
12 
Malware Variant Detection 
[39]. 
Khalid 
Mohamed 
Abdelrahman 
Y Alzarooni 
(2012) 
In this research a new technique that defeats the downside of current malicious 
software detection processes was postulated by examining the meaning of 
known malware codes. The procedures involve three significant investigation 
techniques: “the proposing of a semantic signature”, “slicing analysis”, and “test 
data generation analysis “. 
13 
An Integrated Malware 
Detection and Classification 
System [40].  
Ronghua 
Tian (2011) 
The aims of this thesis are to develop effective and efficient methodologies, 
which can be applied to continuously improve the performance of detection and 
classification on malware collected over an extended period of time. 
14 
Dealing with next generation 
Malware [41].  
Roberto 
Paleari 
(2011) 
This group proposed a new architecture for enhancing behavior based 
investigation of dubious programs that affords the end-user to entrust security 
labs with the implementation and investigation of a program and to coerce the 
program to acquit itself as though it was implemented by the end-user.  
15 
Robust & Efficient Malware 
Analysis and host based 
monitoring [42]. 
Monirul I. 
Sharif (2010) 
1) Efficient Methods for enabling static malware analysis. 2) Making dynamic 
analysis approaches more robust. 3) Reversing emulator based obfuscation. 4) 
Anticipating obfuscations that hide trigger based behavior.  
16 
Data mining methods For 
malware detection [14]. 
Siddiqui 
(2008) 
The author postulated a data-extraction architecture to detect malware. 
17 
Behavioral and Structural 
Properties of Malicious Code 
[44]. 
Christopher 
Kruegel 
(2007) 
In this thesis, approaches to distinguish behavioral and structural properties of 
binary codes were postulated. These approaches could be utilized to produce 
nebulous, and meaningful accounts of malicious software and to distinctively 
classify malware in lieu of isolated happenings. 
  
V. MALWARE DETECTION SYSTEM 
REQUIREMENTS 
The system requirements for malware detection are 
as follows: 
R1. Detect Variety of Attacks with Least False Positive 
Rates 
The proliferation of computer intrusions, with 
increasing intricacies and unforeseen circumstances 
means it is imperative for the system to identify new 
intrusions and their predatory designs in order to select 
the appropriate preemptive strategy. 
The requirement is that the system should be 
teachable and be able to be learnt. Also the system 
should be able to be upgraded regularly to 
accommodate every conceivable malevolent activity 
with relatively few false-positive alarms. 
The design has to have a pre-agreed performance 
level and also be secure and should require the 
minimum computation assets because computational 
potential affects the effectiveness of cloud services. 
Hence, the effectiveness of such capabilities should be 
harnessed to manage false positive alarms while 
ensuring an acceptable level of detection performance. 
R2. Super-Fast Detection and Prevention 
Extremely quick detection and prevention is very 
critical for efficient detection of malware because it 
affects the complete system performance and is also 
critical to supply service previously agreed upon 
(QoS). 
R3. Malware Detection System Scalability  
Any good malware detection system should be 
expandable so that it can manage the huge number of 
network nodes that could be free in cyberspace and 
their communication and computational burden. The 
inclusion of a detection and correlation manager also 
has a bearing on the expandability and performance of 
malware detection systems. It is a critical central 
requirement for malware systems, which limits the 
basic infrastructure ability to changing demands such 
as the quantity and magnitude of data used in 
applications. 
R4. Resistance to Compromise  
In estimating its own assessment and preservation 
in the event it is affected by an attacker, a malware 
detection system must shield itself from rouge 
infiltration. A malware detection system should have 
the ability to approve normal behavior and responds 
abnormal behavior. 
VI. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
EXISTING MALWARE DETECTION 
TECHNIQUES 
There are pros and cons of such detection methods 
which need to be compared in order to evaluate and 
make objective decisions for each situation. In the 
previous section of this research it was pointed out that 
attacks could happen due to a flaw in the system. When 
an intrusion is detected an alarm ensues. How well the 
system detects an intrusion depends on the preciseness 
and currency of the database. The more current the 
knowledge of the database the lower the rate of false 
alarms. In addition, the environmental analysis, as 
postulated by the malicious software, is comprehensive 
and therefore it is possible to take corrective steps. 
However, this approach runs into some problems, 
namely, the continuity of the malware detection 
database updating periodically, the fact that it is very 
focused and hence lack of peripheral vision, and lastly, 
to detect intrusion from internal sources.   
Regarding the next option, the behavior-based 
procedure is a standard procedure obtained from 
published information. Any ongoing program is 
referenced against this standard procedure and any 
variance is considered a malicious intrusion. This 
methodology can detect attempted intrusions into 
unsuspecting victims and may be able to uncover new 
onslaughts before they occur. Though, it may not affect 
so much the available technical databases, it will help 
to protect misuse of privileged information or 
information that possesses certain rights or immunity. 
It has, however, two drawbacks: firstly, the high 
incidence of false alarms and secondly, that it requires 
online retraining from time to time. This could result in 
additional exposure to attacks to the detection system 
or false alarms (Table IV). 
TABLE IV: Categorization Based on Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Existing Malware Detection Techniques 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
In spite of the fact that there are two significant 
methodologies in place for the analysis of malicious 
software, there is a shortcoming in the application due 
to a vast spectrum of scenarios that allow malware to 
go undetected. 
In answer to the first research question (RQ1. What 
requirements should malicious software detectors 
comply with to be used effectively?) a list of essentials 
was assembled (in Section V) with reference to the 
attributes of malicious software detection systems. In 
addition, in Section II, the current classification of 
malicious software detection methodologies into 
groups is discussed to elicit a response to the second 
research question (RQ2. What is taxonomy of malware 
detection technique?). In response to the third question 
(RQ3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of 
existing solutions to malware detection?) a list of the 
advantages and disadvantages that meet the list of 
malware detection techniques are discussed (in Section 
VI). 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This research enumerated a detailed classification 
of first class malicious software detection and 
avoidance programs for researchers to ‘bite into’. 
Dedicated importance was assigned to malicious 
software requirements and recognition given to the 
essentials of malware detection and avoidance 
procedures. 
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